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Abstract
With the increasing popularity of graph-based learning, graph
neural networks (GNNs) emerge as the essential tool for gain-
ing insights from graphs. However, unlike the conventional
CNNs that have been extensively explored and exhaustively
tested, people are still worrying about the GNNs’ robustness
under the critical settings, such as financial services. The main
reason is that existing GNNs usually serve as a black-box in
predicting and do not provide the uncertainty on the predic-
tions. On the other side, the recent advancement of Bayesian
deep learning on CNNs has demonstrated its success of quanti-
fying and explaining such uncertainties to fortify CNN models.
Motivated by these observations, we propose UAG, the first
systematic solution to defend adversarial attacks on GNNs
through identifying and exploiting hierarchical uncertainties
in GNNs. UAG develops a Bayesian Uncertainty Technique
(BUT) to explicitly capture uncertainties in GNNs and further
employs an Uncertainty-aware Attention Technique (UAT) to
defend adversarial attacks on GNNs. Intensive experiments
show that our proposed defense approach outperforms the
state-of-the-art solutions by a significant margin.
Introduction
As the emerging trend of extending deep learning from
Euclidean data (e.g., images) to non-Euclidean data (e.g.,
graphs), graph neural network (GNN) (Xu et al. 2019b; Kipf
and Welling 2017; Velicˇkovic´ et al. 2018) wins lots of atten-
tions from both research and industrial domains. Compared
with the conventional graph-learning approaches (e.g., ran-
dom walk (Grover and Leskovec 2016; Perozzi, Al-Rfou, and
Skiena 2014), and graph Laplacians (Luo et al. 2011, 2009;
Cheng et al. 2018)), GNNs excel at both computation effi-
ciency and runtime performance for various tasks, such as the
node classification (Kaspar and Horst 2010; Gibert, Valveny,
and Bunke 2012; Duran and Niepert 2017) and link predic-
tion (Chen, Li, and Huang 2005; Kunegis and Lommatzsch
2009; Tylenda, Angelova, and Bedathur 2009). Despite the
stunning success, people still concern about the robustness
of GNNs, especially in some safety-critical domains (e.g.,
financial services and medicinal chemistry). Existing work
(Zügner and Günnemann 2019; Xu et al. 2019a; Waniek et al.
2018) has shown that GNNs are sensitive to small perturba-
tions on the topology and the node features, which motivates
our work for defending adversarial attacks.
The most recent work, RGCN (Zhu et al. 2019), improves
GNN robustness with a simple strategy that replaces deter-
ministic GNN features with a Gaussian distribution and mea-
sures the variance in the intermediate feature vectors. How-
ever, it assumes fixed GNN weights without quantifying the
uncertainty from GNN models and does not consider the un-
certainty from the graph topology, leading to unsatisfactory
accuracy under severe attacks. We believe the key to improve
the GNN robustness is to develop a powerful technique to
quantify and exploit uncertainties from various sources to
absorb the effect of adversarial attacks.
In this paper, we focus on exploring the benefits of explic-
itly quantifying GNN uncertainty to defend GNNs against
adversarial attacks. And our further investigation shows that
there are two major types of uncertainties in GNNs – the
model uncertainty and the data uncertainty. The former refers
to the uncertainty in model parameters to tell whether the
selected parameters can best suit the distribution of the col-
lected data. The latter refers to the uncertainty in the noisy
data collection, coming from either the noises in the data col-
lection process or the adversarial attacks. However, exploring
these uncertainties is non-trivial since there are several chal-
lenges to overcome:
1. Uncertainty Measurement: How to explicitly measure
the uncertainty of GNNs?
2. Robustness: How to effectively incorporate the measured
uncertainty into existing GNNs for defending adversarial
attacks?
To tackle these challenges, we propose the first Bayesian-
based uncertainty guided approach to defend the GNN effec-
tively. First, we develop a Bayesian Uncertainty Technique
(BUT) based on the powerful Bayesian framework to cap-
ture these uncertainties from different sources. Intuitively, we
measure the uncertainty value for individual nodes where a
higher uncertainty usually indicates a lower prediction accu-
racy. Then, we design an Uncertainty-aware Attention Tech-
nique (UAT) to dynamically adjust the impact of one node
towards its neighboring nodes according to its uncertainty.
In particular, for nodes with high uncertainty that may have
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been attacked, we restrict its feature propagation towards
neighboring nodes in order to absorb the attack impact.
In short, we summerize our contributions as follows:
• We identify two types of uncertainties in GNNs (i.e., model
uncertainty and data uncertainty) and propose a Bayesian
Uncertainty Technique (BUT) to explicitly capture both
types of uncertainties.
• We introduce an Uncertainty-aware Attention Technique
(UAT) to defend the adversarial attack by assigning less
impact (weights) on nodes with high uncertainty, thus,
mitigating their impact on the final prediction.
• Rigorous experiments and studies across various datasets
on mainstream GNNs show that our proposed defense
approach outperforms the state-of-the-art RGCN by a sig-
nificant margin.
Related Work
Graph Neural Network Graph Neural Networks (GNNs)
are now becoming a major way of gaining insights from
the graph structures. It generally includes several graph con-
volutional layers, each of which consists of a neighbor ag-
gregation and a node update step. The most common graph
convolutional layer (Kipf and Welling 2017) computes the
embedding for node v at layer k+1 based on node embedding
at layer k, where k ≥ 0.
h(k+1)v = σ(
∑
u∈N¯(v)
1
cucv
h(k)u ·W (k)) (1)
As shown in Equation 1, h(k)v is the embedding vector for
node v at layer k, W (k) is the GNN weight at layer k, and
N¯(v) = N(v) ∪ v is the set of node v and its neighboring
nodes. cu and cv are fixed values determined by the degree
of node u and v and will be omitted in following sections for
notation simplicity. Intuitively, the graph convolution layer
aggregates information across nodes by averaging features in
nearby nodes. More advanced GNNs utilize different aggre-
gation methods. For example, GAT (Velicˇkovic´ et al. 2018)
aggregates node features with weighted average based on the
cosine similarity between node features.
Graph Adversarial Attacks and Defense Existing works
have explored the robustness of the GNNs in two opposite but
closely related directions, GNN attacks, and GNN defense.
On the attack side, existing GNN attacks can be broadly clas-
sified into two major categories, poisoning (Zügner, Akbarne-
jad, and Günnemann 2018; Zügner and Günnemann 2019)
and evasion (Dai et al. 2018), depending on the time they
happen. The former (poisoning attack) happens during the
training time of the GNNs through modifying training data
and the latter (evasion attack) takes place during the GNN
inference time by changing test data samples. Our work is
orthogonal and complementary to these existing GNN attack
research, since 1) our goal is to minimize the impact of these
GNN attacks by incorporating model and data uncertainties
during the GNN computation; 2) our defense-oriented re-
search may potentially motivate more diverse adversarial
attacks tailored for GNNs.
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Figure 1: Overview of UAG.
On the defense side, RGCN (Zhu et al. 2019) proposes a
novel model to make GCN immune from adversarial attacks
by leveraging Gaussian distributions to reduce the impact
of GNN attacks. Different from RGCN, our UAG is the
first work to identify and quantify how adversarial attacks
affect GNN’s performance – model and data uncertainties that
take both model (weight) and data (topology and embedding
features) into consideration. And we further exploit such
uncertainty information by incorporating a novel technique
(e.g., BUT and UAT) to facilitate the defense.
Bayesian Neural Network and Uncertainty Many research
efforts have been made towards developing Bayesian Neural
Network to measure uncertainty in computer vision (Kendall
and Gal 2017; Gal and Ghahramani 2016a,b; Alex Kendall
and Cipolla 2017), natural language processing (Xiao and
Wang 2019), and time series analysis (Zhu and Laptev 2017).
These works usually focus on convolutional neural networks
and use Bayesian Neural Network as a regularization tech-
nique. Some recent contributions (Zhang et al. 2019; Hasan-
zadeh et al. 2020) extend the Bayesian Neural Network to the
graph domain as a stochastic regularization technique. These
works aim to solve the over-smoothing problem in GNNs
and do not explicitly quantify the uncertainty. To the best
of our knowledge, we are the first to explicitly quantify the
uncertainty in the graph domain and exploit the uncertainty
to defend adversarial attacks.
Methodology
The overview of UAG is presented in Figure 1. UAG takes
two inputs – the adjacency matrix A ∈ RN×N and the node
features X ∈ RN×D, where N is the number of nodes and
D is the dimension of node features. There are two main
branches in UAG – the probabilistic branch (including the
Model Uncertainty Branch (MUB) and the Data Uncertainty
Branch (DUB)) and the deterministic branch, where the ar-
chitecture and weights are different across branches. Given
the graph data (A,X), the probabilistic branch measures the
node-wise uncertainty U = [UM , UD] ∈ RN×2 from the
GNN model weights and the graph data. Here, the probabilis-
tic branch adopts a novel Bayesian Uncertainty Technique
(BUT) to measure the uncertainty for each node due to the
adversarial attacks. The deterministic branch takes the mea-
sured node-wise uncertainty U and the graph data (A,X) to
generate the node classification results Y ∈ RN . It contains
an Uncertainty-aware Attention Technique (UAT) to adap-
tively adjust the edge attention during the inference to defend
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Figure 2: Bayesian Uncertainty Technique Overview. (a) Model Uncertainty Branch (MUB); (b) Data Uncertainty Branch (DUB)
against adversarial attacks.
Bayesian Uncertainty Technique
Bayesian uncertainty technique measures two sources of un-
certainties – the model uncertainty UM ∈ RN and the data
uncertainty UD ∈ RN . Formally, following the law of total
variance, the uncertainty in the prediction Y is
V ar(Y ) = V ar(E[Y |A,X]) + E[V ar(Y |A,X)]
= UM (Y |A,X) + UD(Y |A,X) (2)
Here, we use a model uncertainty branch (MUB) and a
data uncertainty branch (DUB) to access UM (Y |A,X) and
UD(Y |A,X), respectively.
Model Uncertainty. The model uncertainty UM measures
the uncertainty in the mapping process E[Y |A,X] due to
model weight selection. We use a 2-layer GCN to quantify the
model uncertainty. Instead of using fixed weights, we utilize
a probability distribution to describe the uncertainty from
the model weights, as illustrated in Figure 2(a). Formally,
given the graph data (A,X) and the partial label Y ∈ RNL
with NL as the number of labeled nodes, we first train the
weight posterior distribution p(W |A,X). Then, we conduct
the prediction mapping procedure as
p(Y |X,A) =
∫
W
p(Y |W,A,X) p(W |A,X)dW (3)
Since the exact inference is intractable, we adopt the MC
dropout variational inference (Gal and Ghahramani 2016a)
method by multiplying a deterministic model weight WMUB
with a random variableB following the Bernoulli distribution.
This provides q(W ) as an approximation to the true posterior
p(W |A,X). In particular, the model weights W follows
q(W ) ∼ B WMUB
P (B) ∼ Bernoulli(p) (4)
where  is the Hadamard product, and p is a hyperparameter
(=0.8 by default in our evaluation). During training, we can
train the weight by minimizing the cross-entropy loss
Lmodel = − 1
T
T∑
t=1
log p(Yˆt|Wˆt, A,X)+ 1− p
2T
||WMUB ||2 (5)
where Wˆt is sampled from q(W ), Yˆt is the prediction under
sampled weight Wˆt, and T is the number of samples during
the MC dropout variational inference. During inference, we
perform the Monte Carlo integration:
E(Y |A,X) = 1
T
T∑
t=1
Yˆt (6)
where Yˆt ∈ RL is the prediction after the softmax layer, and
L is the number of classes in the graph data.
Here, we observe that applying Bernoulli distribution at
different granularities leads to different probabilistic inter-
pretation. To provide a comprehensive measurement on the
model uncertainty, we apply dropout independently for indi-
vidual GNN layers, channels, nodes, and edges
W (k)uv = B
(k)
uv B(k)u W (k) (7)
where W (k) ∈ Rfk×fk+1 is the GNN weights at the kth
layer, B(k)uv ∈ R determines the dropout on the edge-level,
B
(k)
u ∈ {0, 1}fk drops the weight at the channel level, and
fk is the number of feature channels at layer k. From the
perspective of individual nodes, we have
h(k+1)v = σ(
∑
u∈N¯(v)
h(k)u ·W (k)uv )
= σ(
∑
u∈N¯(v)
h(k)u · (B(k)uv B(k)u W (k)))
(8)
where N¯(v) = N(v) ∪ v. Noting that this dropout also pro-
vides a Bayesian view of dropping edges or nodes when
either B(k)uv = 0 or B
(k)
u = 0.
Given the Bayesian framework on GNNs, we can measure
the model uncertainty as the variance in predictions
UM (Y |A,X) = V ar(Y |A,X)
= E(Y 2|A,X)− [E(Y |A,X)]2
=
1
T
T∑
t=1
Yˆ 2t − [E(Y |A,X)]2
(9)
Here, we additionally apply a reduce operation to trans-
form the L-dimension vector UM to a scalar value as the
model uncertainty.
Figure 3: Relationship between accuracy and node diver-
sity. DICE_0.2 and Mettack_0.2 indicates perturbing 20%
edges with DICE and Mettack, respectively.
Data Uncertainty The data uncertainty UD measures the
prediction noise intrinsic to the data inputs. There are two
standard approaches to identify the data uncertainty on each
node. One approach utilizes the maximum predicted proba-
bility to measure confidence in the prediction. However, this
confidence comes as a side effect of the model training and
lacks sophisticated probabilistic interpretation. The other ap-
proach from the CNN domain predicts the uncertainty value
based on the image inputs. However, naively borrowing this
approach into the GNN domain focuses only on the node fea-
tures and fails to exploit the important topology information
in the graph data.
Instead, we aim to capture the data uncertainty that is
intrinsic to the graph topology in terms of node diversity
Div
(k)
node, defined as the number of different labels in the
node’s k-hop neighbors. Our key observation is that adversar-
ial attacks on graph data usually increase the node diversity
and add edge connections between nodes with different labels.
For example, DICE attack (delete edges internally, connect
externally) (Waniek et al. 2018) exploits the node label infor-
mation to increase node diversity by deleting edges between
nodes with the same label and adding edges between nodes
with different labels. Figure 3 shows the accuracy among
nodes that have node diversity larger than various thresholds.
We observe that the accuracy usually decreases significantly
as the node diversity increases, which holds for both the clean
graph data and the attacked graph data from various attacking
algorithms.
To this end, we explicitly measure the data uncertainty by
treating the prediction as a Gaussian distribution and setting
the variance to be the node diversity, as illustrated in Figure
2(b). Formally, we have
Y ∼ N(µˆ(A,X), σˆ2(A,X)) (10)
where µˆ and σˆ2 are the predicted label and node diversity,
respectively. Here, we parameterize the µˆ and σˆ2 with the
adjacency matrix A and the node feature X and use a 2-layer
GCN to predict their values. During inference, we will use
the σˆ2(A,X) as the data uncertainty
UD(Y |A,X) = σˆ2(A,X) (11)
Figure 4: Illustration of UAT. (a) Aggregation on the clean
graph; (b) aggregation when the red node is attack.
To train the data uncertainty, we have two losses on the
labeled nodes and unlabeled nodes, respectively. On the la-
beled nodes, we focus on the ground truth labels and have
a KL-divergence that requires the predicted distribution to
match with the ground truth distribution
L1 = KL(N(µˆ(A,X), σˆ
2(A,X))|N(Y, σ2)) (12)
where the Y comes from the ground truth label and σ2 mea-
sures the node diversity Div(k)node in the graph data. When
computing the node diversity, we utilize only labeled node in
the clean graph data. In particular, for a given node, we first
collect all labeled 2-hop neighboring nodes and then count
the number of distinct labels. On the unlabeled nodes, similar
to the unsupervised learning (Bojchevski and Günnemann
2018) on graph data, we focus on the graph topology and
adopt an energy-based unsupervised loss
L2 =
∑
i
∑
k<l
∑
jk∈Nik
∑
jk∈Nil
(E2ijk + exp
−Eijl )
Eij = DKL(N(Yˆj , σˆ
2
j )||N(Yˆi, σˆ2i ))
(13)
Assuming that a node tends to have a similar label with
neighboring nodes, this loss implicitly captures the node
diversity by forcing higher feature similarities in neighboring
nodes.
Uncertainty-aware Attention Technique
The uncertainty-aware attention technique (UAT) adaptively
adjusts the edge attention during the inference to defend
against adversarial attacks, as illustrated in Figure 4. We
equip a 2-layer GCN with our UAT. On a clean graph (Figure
4a), we adopt edge aggregation similar to existing GNNs
that each node aggregates and propagates information across
neighboring nodes. On an attacked graph (e.g., the red node
in Figure 4b), UAT adaptively limits the information prop-
agation between the attacked node and other nodes. While
existing works (Zügner, Akbarnejad, and Günnemann 2018)
have shown that attacking one node in the graph can also lead
to the wrong prediction on other nodes, UAT mitigates it by
reducing the impact from attacked nodes to remaining nodes.
Formally, given the feature h(k+1)u for each node u at the
k + 1 layer, we compute an attention Attτ (u) for each node
u and compute each GNN layer as
h(k+1)v = σ(
∑
u∈N¯(v)
Attuvτ · h(k)u ·W (k))
Attuvτ = min(Attτ (u), Attτ (v))
(14)
where τ ∈ {M,D} indicates whether we are using model
uncertainty or the data uncertainty, each node embedding hku
is weighted by an attention. Here, we use attention from both
nodes u and v to decide the attention value on the edge. Note
that the deterministic branch focuses on improving accuracy
and utilizes independent weight from the probabilistic branch,
which focuses on capturing uncertainties. We design two
attentions to measure the model uncertainty and the data
uncertainty, respectively
Attτ (u) = exp(−ζ · Uτ,u)
ζ = ατ · exp(−βτ ·Range(Uτ )) (15)
where Uτ,u measures the uncertainty on node u, and ατ > 0
and βτ > 0 are two hyperparameters to adjust the impact
from uncertainty. Intuitively, a larger uncertainty Uτ,u on a
node u leads to lower weight in the information propagation
along with the graph topology. Here, we additionally utilize
a Range(Uτ ) operation to measure the global uncertainty
diversity in order to absorb the uniform uncertainty scale
change on all nodes under diverse attacks. In particular, we
collect Uτ for all nodes and measure the Range(Uτ ) as the
absolute difference between the first and the third quartiles.
We have investigated several functions to combine the data
uncertainty and the model uncertainty, and find out a simple
minimal combination can already lead to good performance
AttBoth(u) = min(AttM , AttD) (16)
Intuitively, we restrict the information propagation from one
node when it shows either a high model uncertainty or a high
data uncertainty.
Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate UAG on three popular datasets
and compare UAG with three baselines to show its effective-
ness.
Experiment Environments
Datasets We select the most typical datasets (Cora, Citeseer,
and Pubmed) used by many GNN papers (Kipf and Welling
2017; Xu et al. 2019b; Hamilton, Ying, and Leskovec 2017)
to evaluate our UAG. In these datasets, the node represents
documents, edge refers to citations, and each node has its
own associated bag-of-word features. Table 1 summarizes
the details of these datasets. We follow the common data split
by selecting 10% nodes as the training dataset, 10% nodes as
the validation dataset, and 80% nodes as the testing dataset.
Baselines Graph Convolutional Network (GCN) (Kipf and
Welling 2017) is one of the most popular GNN architec-
tures. It has been widely adopted in node classification,
graph classification, and link prediction tasks. Besides, it
is also the key backbone network for many other GNNs,
such as GraphSage (Hamilton, Ying, and Leskovec 2017),
and differentiable pooling (Diffpool) (Ying et al. 2018).
Graph Attention Network (GAT) (Xu et al. 2019b), another
typical type of GNN, aims to distinguish the graph-structure
that cannot be identified by GCN. GAT differs from GCN
in its aggregation function, which assigns different weights
to different nodes during the aggregation. Robust GCN
Table 1: Datasets for Evaluation.
Dataset #Vertex #Edge #Dim #Class
Citeseer 3,327 9,464 3,703 6
Cora 2,708 10,858 1,433 7
Pubmed 19,717 88,676 500 3
(RGCN) (Zhu et al. 2019), leverages the Gaussian distri-
butions for node representations to amortize the effects of
adversarial attacks.
Attack Methods Random Attack is a popular attack method
that randomly adds fake edges into the graph dataset without
considering the label of nodes. DICE Attack (delete edges in-
ternally, connect externally) (Waniek et al. 2018) exploits the
node label information to increase node diversity by deleting
edges between nodes with the same label and adding edges
between nodes with different labels. Mettack is another rep-
resentative attack that adopts a meta-learning approach to
reason the loss change by iteratively perturbing individual
edges and features.
Platforms. We implement UAG based on PyTorch Geomet-
ric (Fey and Lenssen 2019). We evaluate UAG on a Dell
Workstation T7910 (Ubuntu 18.04) with an Intel Xeon CPU
E5-2603, 64 GB memory, and an NVIDIA 1080Ti GPU with
12GB memory.
Overall Performance
In this section, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our pro-
posed UAG approach (UAG-both) by comparing accuracy
(under different attack methods and different attack ratio)
with the original unoptimized GCN and GAT model as well
as the one equipped with the state-of-the-art RGCN (Zhu et al.
2019) defense method. Besides, to gain more design insights,
we add two more baselines for comparison, including UAG-
Data (only considering data uncertainty) and UAG-Model
(only considering data uncertainty).
Figure 5 shows accuracy performance comparisons for
Random Attack among different implementations on the
Cora, Citeseer, and Pubmed datasets. As we can easily tell
from those three sub-plots, UAG method and its variants
(UAG-Data, UAG-Model, and UAG-Both) consistently out-
perform the state-of-the-art RGCN defense approach. The
major source of such performance improvements is that
UAG effectively captures the data uncertainty and the model
uncertainty, based on which UAG adaptively adjusts the edge
weights and the amount of information propagation between
nodes. For individual dataset settings, with the increase of
the attack ratio, we see the overall trend of accuracy decreas-
ing among these implementations. We also notice that on
Cora and Citeseer dataset, RGCN offers notable accuracy
improvement over the original GAT and GCN. However, it
is still inferior compared with our UAG approach, since we
explicitly capture the uncertainties, instead of relying on a
Gaussian distribution to implicitly defend adversarial attacks.
Another observation is that UAG-Both usually outperforms
UAG-Data and UAG-Model under diverse datasets and attack
ratios. The reason is that the data uncertainty and the model
uncertainty capture uncertainties from different sources and
Figure 5: Results of different methods when adopting Random Attack as the attack method.
Figure 6: Results of different methods when adopting DICE Attack as the attack method
Figure 7: Results of different methods when adopting Mettack as the attack method
Figure 8: Relationship between Accuracy and Uncertainty. Left: Model Uncertainty v.s. Accuracy. Mid: Data Uncertainty v.s.
Accuracy. Right: Data Uncertainty v.s. True Diversity.
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Figure 9: Loss Design Benefits and Parameter Analysis.
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Figure 10: Left: Accuracy of Static Edge Weights. Right:
Edge weight distribution under Random Attack.
combining these two values usually offers a more compre-
hensive measurement on the prediction uncertainties.
On DICE Attack (Figure 6), besides the similar observa-
tions as the above attack setting, we have more observations.
GAT and RGCN are sensitive towards DICE attack as demon-
strated with significant accuracy drop with the increase of
attack ratio, because DICE intentionally increases the node
diversity by adding cross-community connections (i.e., edges
between nodes with different labels). In contrast, our UAG
approach can handle this attack effectively, because it ex-
plicitly captures the node diversity as the data uncertainty.
We also observe a similar performance trend on Mettack
(Figure 7) as the previous two types of attacks and further
demonstrate the advantage of our UAG approach in terms of
higher accuracy under diverse attack ratios.
Ablation Studies
In this section, we conduct a set of ablation studies for in-
depth analysis.
Accuracy and Uncertainty. As shown in Figure 8(a) and
(b), the increase of the model uncertainty and data uncer-
tainty would lead to the decrease of the model accuracy. This
also strengthens our initial assumption that the relationship
between uncertainties and model accuracy can be explored to
defend adversarial attacks. Figure 8(c) exhibits the relation
between data uncertainty and node diversity, showing the
effectiveness of our Loss design (Eq 12) in learning the node
diversity.
Loss Design Benefits. Figure 9(a) validates the effectiveness
of the two loss designs in the data uncertainty. Here, L1
(Eq 12) forces UAG to learn the node diversity in labeled
nodes, while L2 (Eq 13) is an unsupervised loss that im-
plicitly encodes the node diversity in unlabeled nodes. We
observe that the UAG with L1+L2 outperforms only L1 or L2,
since it fully exploits both the labeled and unlabeled node.
Parameter Analysis. Figure 9(b) and (c) shows the impact
from different values of the data-uncertainty-related hyperpa-
rameters and the model-uncertainty-related hyperparameters
on the UAG performance. Intuitively, larger values of ατ and
lower value of βτ lead to a stronger impact from the uncer-
tainties and higher accuracy under large attack ratios, where
τ ∈ {M,D}. However, setting ατ too large or βτ too small
may also impose too many constraints on the information
propagation. In our experiments, we can achieve satisfying
results by using ατ = 15 and βτ = 2.5.
Uncertainty on Attention Values. Figure 10 visualizes the
weight changes under different ratios of Random Attack. We
can notice that a higher random attack ratio would lead to
denser weight distribution towards zero. This is because our
UAG approach would try to amortize the impact of such
attacks by changing weight values towards zero that can
minimize the value propagation between neighboring nodes.
Furthermore, we consider pre-assigning different weights
to show the key importance of weight value for adversarial
attacks. We can see that the higher the static weight value the
poor the performance in maintaining model accuracy under
the attack. The major reason is more “attack impacts” will
be propagated to different nodes through node aggregation,
thus, lowering the model overall performance. Our UAG, on
the other hand, can adaptively determine the weight value
for different nodes based on the model and data uncertainty
factor, thus, largely absorbing the influence of the adversarial
attack.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose UAG, the first systematic defense
solution for adversarial attacks on GNNs by considering hier-
archical uncertainty in GNNs. UAG incorporates a Bayesian
Uncertainty Technique (BUT) to explicitly capture uncer-
tainty in GNNs and further employs an Uncertainty-aware
Asymmetry Attention Technique (UAT) to fortify GNNs. Ex-
tensive experiments further demonstrate UAG’s advantages
over the state-of-the-art solutions. Overall, our work paves a
new way of exploring uncertainty benefits in GNN research.
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